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BUT NAMES WILL 'NEVER HURT ME: HIV
SURVEILLANCE & MANDATORY
REPORTING
Twenty-year-old Nushawn Williams knew he was infected with the
human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV").' Still, he had unprotected sex
with dozens of women. 2 As a result, he has infected at least ten women
with HIV and exposed many more to the deadly virus.'
Authorities knew in August 1996 that Williams was infected but
could do nothing." New York law prohibits releasing information re-
garding individuals' HIV status without their consent.' In the county
where Williams resides, however, officials used a court order to circum-
vent. the law.' After pinpointing Williams as the source of a traceable
pattern of HIV infections, public health officials invoked an "imminent
danger" clause in the law to obtain a judge's permission to reveal
Williams' identity.'
In 1988, the New York Legislature enacted a law designed to treat
HIV tests differently than tests for other sexually transmitted diseases'
If individuals test positive for a sexually transmitted disease, such as
syphilis, their names are reported to county health agencies.9 Officials
then contact the individuals and urge them to reveal the names of their
sexual partners.'° Without revealing the names of the individuals car-
rying the disease, the county then attempts to contact their partners
and encourages them to be tested."
By contrast, if individuals test positive for HIV, their names are not
reported anywhere.' 2 Thousands of New Yorkers are tested anony-
mously at clinics every year; they are assigned numbers so that no one
I See Jeffrey L. Reynolds, Slop Unsafe Sex, Save Patient's Privacy, NEWSDAY, Nov. 4, 1997, at
A37.
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See William F. Buckley, Editorial, Public Must Know Carriers of HIV, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS..
NEWS, Oct. 31, 1997, at 513.
5 See Reynolds, supra note 1, at A37.
6 See id
7 See id.
8 See Tofu Precious, State's HIV Confidentiality Policy May Change, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 1,
1997, at Al.
9 See id.
19 See id.
IL See id.
L2 See id
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will ever know who they are. 13 Health officials can encourage those who
test positive to tell their partners, but there is no formal mechanism
through which officials can track down potential HIV victims." Critics
say this system of blanket confidentiality must change. i 5 Thus, state and
federal officials are currently scrutinizing the way the disease is re-
ported. 16
Every state mandates name-based reporting of acquired immune
deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") diagnoses, as opposed to HIV, and pub-
lic health departments maintain these name-based AIDS case regis-
tries.' 7 This form of AIDS surveillance has, until recently, formed the
cornerstone of the nation's efforts to monitor and characterize HIV."'
Many public health officials, however, are concerned that existing
AIDS surveillance efforts are becoming outdated due to changes in the
epidemic.I9
 With new treatment options slowing the progression of
HIV and the resulting fewer numbers of AIDS cases in the United
States, many believe that AIDS surveillance data are less indicative of
the actual number and demographics of the HIV-positive population."
States have responded to the need for improved HIV surveillance
data with varying HIV reporting systems." A majority of states have
taken AIDS case reporting one step further by adopting some form of
mandatory HIV name reporting. 22
 Under a mandatory name-based re-
porting system, names of individuals testing HIV-positive are reported
to state health departments and compiled in central HIV registries."
Concerns about keeping HIV surveillance data confidential, however,
13 See Precious, supra note 8, at Al.
14 See id.
15 See id.
In See Lynda Richardson, Progress on AIDS Brings Movement for Less Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1997, at Al.
17 See Anna Forbes, Naming Names, AIDS POL'Y & L., May 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Forbes,
Naming Names). Every state has a statute or regulation requiring laboratories and physicians to
report the names of individuals with newly diagnosed AIDS to local and state health departments.
See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., National HIV Case Reporting for the United States—A Defining
Moment in the History of the Epidemic, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1163 (1997). Case reports
follow uniform standards to provide complete, timely and accurate data. See id. Reported infor-
mation includes demographic data, the name of the physician or laboratory snaking the diagnosis,
the patient's risk history, a laboratory analysis, the patient's clinical status and any referrals for
treatment or services. See id.
In See Gostin et al., supra note 17, at 1162.
19 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline Marks Start of a New Era in Epidemic: Downward Trend
Could Change Level of Services, Funding, AIDS ALERT, Nov. 1, 1997, at 121, available in 1997 WL
8961981 [hereinafter First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline).
20 See Mark Schools, What's in a Name? VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 7, 1998, at 37.
21 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
22 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 1.
43
 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response to the Changing Epidemic: Moving to HIV
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have prompted other states to adopt reporting with non-name iden-
tifiers." Some states conduct HIV surveillance by a unique identifier
system, using numeric codes instead of patient names. 25 Most high-in-
cidence states, however, have not yet adopted an HIV reporting sys-
tem .26
This Note explores the legal and policy considerations surround-
ing HIV reporting systems. Section I briefly reviews the distinction
between AIDS and HIV. 27 Section II discusses the need for HIV surveil-
lance." Section III examines the two main reporting systems, manda-
tory name reporting and unique identifier reporting. 29 Section IV
reviews the current standards courts apply to the constitutional issues
that HIV reporting systems raise. 3° Finally, section V discusses the con-
stitutionality of these systems and argues that, although both systems
are likely to be constitutional, unique identifier systems are better
suited for HIV surveillance than name reporting systems."
I. DISTINGUISHING AIDS AND HIV
In order to understand the tools used to monitor AIDS and HIV,
it is helpful to distinguish between the two conditions. AIDS, first
reported in the United States in 1981, is a disease caused by HIV. 32 HIV
progressively destroys the body's ability to fight infections by killing or
impairing the immune system's cells. 33
Many individuals do not develop symptoms when they are first
infected with HIV." Some, however, develop a flu-like illness within a
few months after viral exposure." These symptoms are often mistaken
for symptoms of another viral infection because they usually disappear
within a week to a month." More severe symptoms may not develop
Surveillance by Unique Identifier and Other Non-Name Based Surveillance Systems (Oct. 1997)
<hup://hivinsite.uscf.eduitopics/testing/209 8.347b.html> (hereinafter Creating an Effective
Public Health Response].
24 See id
25 See id. at 2.
26 See id.
27 See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 53-116 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 117-151 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 152-246 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 247-405 and accompanying text.
32 See AEGIS: HIV Infection and AIDS (last modified May 1997) Chttp://www.aegis.com/top-
ics/whataidsis.html > [hem:Mailer AEGIS].
33 See id.
64 See id.
35 See id. Symptoms may include a fever, headache, malaise and enlarged lymph nodes. See
id
35 See id.
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for ten or more years after HIV exposure to the body." During this
period, HIV destroys the immune system's cells." This process is most
apparent as a decline in the blood levels of CD4+T cells."
The term AIDS applies to the most advanced stages of HIV infec-
tion.° The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
("CDC"), the agency responsible for tracking the spread of the disease
in the United States, develops the official criteria for the definition of
AIDS.'" In 1993, the CDC revised its definition to include all HIV-in-
fected people who have fewer than 200 CD4+T cells.° Additionally,
the definition includes twenty-six clinical conditions that affect people
with advanced HIV.° Most of these conditions ordinarily do not harm
healthy individuals." In individuals with AIDS, however, these infec-
tions may be fatal because the immune system is weak and the body
cannot fight off bacteria and viruses. 45 Many individuals become so
debilitated by AIDS symptoms that they can neither hold steady em-
ployment nor do household chores 9 6
 Others experience phases of
intense life-threatening illness followed by phases of normal function-
ing.47
Because the early stages of HIV are often unaccompanied by
symptoms, the disease is primarily detected by testing an individual's
blood for HIV antibodies." These antibodies are generally not detect-
able until one to three months following infection and may take up to
six months to be generated in quantities large enough to appear in
standard blood tests." Over the past ten years, therapies have been
37 Ste AEGIS, supra note 32. This period of "asymptomatic" infection varies considerably from
person to person. See id.
36 See id
" See id. These cells, also called T9 cells, are the immune system's key infection fighters. See
" See
41 se, id.
42 See AEGIS, supra note 32. Healthy adults usually have CD4+T cell counts of 1000 or more.
See id, During the course of HIV infection, many individuals experience a gradual decline in the
number of these cells, while others may have abrupt and dramatic drops in the cell counts. See
id.
13 See id.
44 See it
43 See id. Opportunistic infections common in people with AIDS cause symptoms such as
coughing, shortness of breath, seizures, dementia, severe and persistent diarrhea, fever, vision
loss, severe headaches, extreme fatigue, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination, coma, abdominal
cramps or difficult or painful swallowing. See id.
46 See id.
47 See AEGIS, supra note 32.
48 See it
49 See is
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developed to fight HIV infection. 50 The Food and Drug Administra-
tion has approved several drugs for treatment including reverse tran-
scriptase inhibitors and, more recently, protease inhibitors." Currently
available drugs, however, do not cure people of HIV infection or
AIDS.52
II. THE NEED FOR HIV SURVEILLANCE
HIV was not discovered until 1983 and testing for HIV antibodies
did not become available until the mid-198Ds." Since then, there has
been much debate about whether the names of H1V-infected individu-
als should be reported to confidential registries of public health de-
partments. 54 This section describes the conditions that sparked that
debate.
A. New Treatment & Early Detection
Current AIDS data indicate that fewer people are dying of AIDS
and that the number of AIDS cases per year is declining. 55 In 1996, the
incidents of illnesses and deaths due to AIDS declined for the first time
in the epidemic's history. 56 According to the CDC, deaths due to AIDS
in 1996 decreased 23% and the decline was even greater for certain
populations, such as homosexual and bisexual men." Some experts
suggest that the effect on these trends will become even more striking
as more HIV-infected individuals are treated. 58
Many health experts insist that successful new drug therapies
make early detection and treatment even more crucial.° For example,
5° See id
61 See id. Reverse transcriptasc inhibitors interrupt an early stage of virus replication. See id,
These classes of drugs, including AZT, may slow the spread of HIV in the body and delay the
onset of opportunistic infections. See id. They do riot, however, prevent transmission of HIV to
other individuals. See id. Protease inhibitors interrupt virus replication at a later step in its life
cycle. See id, Combination u eatment using both types of drugs is necessary to effectively suppress
the virus because HIV can become resistant to both. See id.
52 See AEGIS, supra note 32. Each of the drugs also have side effects that can be severe. See
id. For example, AZT may deplete red or white blood cells. See id. Protease inhibitors can cause
nausea, diarrhea or gastrointestinal symptoms. See id.
66 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting: A Public Health Case for Protecting Civil Liberties
(Oct. 1997) <http://www.aciu.org/issues/aids/nainereport.honl#appendixl > (hereinafter HIV
Surveillance and Name Reporting).
54 See Richardson, supra note 16, at Al.
55 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
56 See Gostin ct al., supra note 17, at 1162.
37 See
68 See id.
59 See Richardson, supra note 16, at Al.
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combination drug therapies with protease inhibitors have dramatically
improved the health and prolonged the lives of many HIV-infected
individuals.° Recent research suggests that a treatment regimen of HIV
reverse-transcriptase inhibitors and protease inhibitors reduces mortal-
ity and delays disease progression. 6' Individuals who receive this type
of regimen have been found to have lower levels of circulating virus,
suggesting that treatment not only benefits the patient but also may
reduce the risk of transmission. 62
 In response to the promise of com-
bination drug therapies and to clinical evidence which suggests that
such therapies are more effective when started early in the course of
HIV disease, most treatment guidelines now call for early and aggres-
sive intervention.° Thus, some believe there are currently more com-
pelling reasons to encourage testing and provide links to treatment
than when few effective treatment options existed. 64
Public health officials also believe that HIV reporting data will
become more important as the number of HIV cases increases as a
result of improved AIDS treatment.° Individuals with HIV infection
are generally living longer and progressing to an AIDS diagnosis much
more slowly.66
 Thus, AIDS surveillance alone may not provide an accu-
rate view of the extent of the epidemic because those with HIV, but
not AIDS, will not be represented.67
 Without comprehensive HIV data,
the CDC could have difficulty determining where the epidemic is
moving and whether the rate of new HIV cases is slowing .° In fact, new
HIV infections could be increasing. 69
 Without comprehensive HIV
reporting data, however, the CDC's ability to monitor the extent of the
hypothetical increase or its demographic characteristics is limited. 7°
Furthermore, the true impact of prevention efforts is difficult to evalu-
ate without HIV data.7'
6°
 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 2.
61 See Gostin et al., supra note 17, at 1162.
ss see a	
•
65
 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 3.
64 See id. The New England Journal of Medicine has urged mandatory reporting of HIV
infections to state health departments to increase the chances that people will get early neatment.
See Medical Journal Wants Mandatory HIV Reports, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 11, 1997, at A16,
available in 1997 WL 13119142.
65 See First Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
66
 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 3.
67 See id.
66
 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
69 See id
"See id
71 See id.
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B. Funding
Another factor lending support for HIV reporting is that federal
funding is allocated based on the epidemic's impact on states, and
thus, may be tied to the number of HIV cases and not just AIDS cases. 72
Commentators note that shifts in funding may be made geographically
as HIV data reveal new infections increasing in certain regions." They
argue that many low to moderate HIV-incidence states have adopted
mandatory name-based reporting because of the expected link be-
tween HIV name reporting and increased access to federal funds. 74 For
instance, the AIDS Action Foundation reports that legislative efforts to
implement mandatory name reporting in New Jersey were unsuccessful
in 1985. 75 In 1990, however, the legislation passed and was instituted
in September 1991, when the state simultaneously received a $450,000
grant from the CDC for a computer surveillance program." Thus,
because federal money is allocated based on the epidemic's impact on
states, some state health officials believe that those states which only
report AIDS cases, such as New York, may have difficulty adequately
describing their share of the AIDS burden." As a result, these states
could be at a disadvantage in not having HIV infection data."
C. The Trend Toward HIV Surveillance
1, The CDC
The United States Public Health Service has asked all states to
begin monitoring and reporting everyone who tests HTV-positive. 72
Until September 1997, the CDC had only asked states to report cases
of full-blown AIDS," Now the CDC says that HIV reporting by states
72 See id.; Richardson, supra note 16, at Al.
79 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121. Before AIDS case data became
less reliable, the CDC noted that the epidemic was decreasing in epicenters of the Northwest and
West, where it first took hold. See id. This, however, has not been the case in the South. See id.
AIDS incidence decreased only 1% in the South in 1996, compared to 12% in the West and 8%
in the Northeast. See id.
74 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 1.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Richardson, .supra note 16, at Al.
78 See id.
79 See Fluntly Collins & Warren King, U.S. Wants States to Report Those Who Test HIV-Positive,
SeArrLE TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A2.
B0 See id. Full-blown AIDS typically develops more than eight years after initial infection with
HIV. See id.
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would help public health officials monitor the course of the AIDS
epidemic and target prevention and treatment programs to the most
needy populations." Furthermore, the CDC has advised all states not
currently requiring name-based HIV reporting to implement "inte-
grated HIV and AIDS surveillance."2
2. Uses of HIV Surveillance Data
The CDC states that HIV surveillance can "provide a more timely
measure of emerging patterns of HIV transmission, a more complete
estimate of the number of people with HIV infection and disease, and
a better mechanism to evaluate access to HIV testing and medical
and prevention services than AIDS surveillance alone." 83 Public health
officials are convinced that HIV surveillance data could provide infor-
mation as to the minimum number of persons known to be infected
in a given area for whom services may be required." These officials
believe this estimate would provide an appropriate benchmark for
distributing federal, state and local funds. 85
 These officials further
argue that HIV case surveillance could provide more recent data re-
garding the demographics of those people who have contracted HIV
as opposed to those with AIDS. 86
Health officials also note that HIV case surveillance may provide
a basis for offering voluntary referrals to appropriate prevention and
treatment programs for HIV-infected individuals." They contend that
HI
 See id. The CDC, however., has not estimated the cost of the stepped-up reporting. See id.
82 See Daniell DeNoon, AIDS Testing CDC Recommends Name-Based HIV Surveillance, AIDS
WIU.Y. PLUS, May 18, 1998. States identified by the CDC as already having "integrated" surveillance
programs are those that require name-based reporting. See id.
83
 Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 3. The CDC Advisory
Committee on the Prevention of HIV Infection has thus specified five goals for public health
surveillance of HIV and AIDS: (1) target primary and secondary prevention; (2) evaluate the
efficacy of prevention activities; (3) determine eligibility for federal, state and local health re-
sources for services for HIV-infected individuals; (4) project future resources needed for care and
prevention efforts; and (5) educate the public about the scope and impact of the epidemic. See
COUNCIL OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL EPIDEMIOLOGISTS AND CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE OF HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, May 21-22, 1997
thereinafter CSTE & CDC].
84 See CSTE & CDC, supra note 83.
85 See Richardson, supra note 16, at Al.
86 See CSTE & CDC, supra note 83. A higher proportion of persons with HIV, as opposed to
AIDS, were women, blacks and 13-24 year-olds in cases reported from 1994 through 1996. See id.
Although this may partly reflect differences in patterns of HIV, these trends support preliminary
findings from other studies which suggest that women and minorities have the highest rates of
recently acquired infection. See id.
87 See id. Some states, including South Carolina, Missouri, Minnesota and New Jersey, arc
offering medical and social service referrals for HIV-infected people. See id.
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early entrance into care slows the development of disease, may lower
the spread of infection and results in substantial health care savings
for the individual and the community. 88 Additionally, health officials
believe that surveillance data may be used to target and evaluate
specific HIV prevention interventions, including recommended proce-
dures designed to reduce the risk of perinatal HIV transmission. 8°
Furthermore, public health officials note that HIV reporting
would enable public health professionals to help physicians locate and
notify patients who do not return for their HIV test results, and thus
remain unaware of their infection. 90 These officials also urge using HIV
reporting to support voluntary partner notification efforts. 9 ' The
health officials note that the partner notification process increases the
chances that women of childbearing age and those who do not per-
ceive a personal risk for infection will become aware of their possible
HIV exposure. 92 Thus, these officials contend that partners who are
provided information about their at-risk status will be able to access
needed early intervention services much sooner. 93
3. Limitations of HIV Case Surveillance Data
Even if all states required HIV reporting, some experts recognize
that HIV surveillance data may not represent all HIV cases. 94 They
argue that many cases will still go unreported because some at-risk
people do not seek testing, some infected people are tested anony-
mously and variations in testing practices may influence the data. 95
Furthermore, these experts note that states have initiated reporting at
different times, thereby potentially influencing the number of HIV
cases reported. 99 Using the most conservative estimates, the CDC pro-
88 See BUREAU of HIV AND STD PREVENTION, TEXAS DEPT OF HEALTH, RECOMMENDATIONS
ON HIV INFECTION REPORTING 4 (1998) [hereinafter BUREAU OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION).
89 See CSTE & CDC, supra mite 83. A CDC analysis found that by September 1995, HIV
surveillance states identified 49% of children who were born to infected mothers in 1993
compared to only 5% identified in states with only AIDS reporting. See id. Soule experts believe
these states can evaluate recommendations for 'educing perinatal transmission and voluntary
testing of pregnant women. See id. Additionally, they believe that changes in rates of perinatal
transmission can be monitored in a timely fashion. See id.
90 See SuREnu OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, s upra note 88, at 5.
93 See id.
92 See id. Thus, for those who are HIV-infected and pregnant, public health officials contend
that timely medical intervention can greatly reduce transmission of the virus to newborns. See id.
95 See id.
M See CSTE & CDC, supra note 83.
95 See id.; First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
96 See CSTE & CDC, supra note 83.
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jected that states with HIV reporting were picking up only about 25%
of infections during the previous year to year-and-a-half. 97 At the same
time, however, the CDC estimated that if all states had HIV reporting,
approximately two-thirds of all HIV infections in the country already
would have been reported."
4. The Federal Government and HIV Surveillance
The "I-IW Prevention Act of 1997" proposes mandatory, confiden-
tial reporting of HIV infection and mandatory partner notification; it
also includes a provision allowing providers to refuse invasive treat-
ment to patients who will not agree to an HW test. 99 The bill would
require states to: report all HIV cases to the CDC; notify partners
exposed to HIV (the CDC now requires states to notify partners for
AIDS cases only); require HIV testing for people accused of sexual
crimes; require insurance companies to provide test results to appli-
cants; and permit parents to know the HW status of adopted chil-
dren.m
The bill would also force every state to eliminate anonymous HW
testing.lin Critics argue that people who suspect that they are HIV-posi-
tive might delay testing and treatment for fear of being "outed" with
HIV to employers and insurance companies.m Critics contend that
untested individuals could die unnecessarily by not participating in
promising new medical treatments available at the incipient stages of
the disease.'°3
If states do not comply with the mandatory reporting require-
ment, the bill would authorize the federal government to withhold that
state's portion of its Medicaid dollars.'° 1 Fifty percent of all Americans
with HW rely upon Medicaid for their health care.m Thus, critics argue
that any attempt to restrict or withhold Medicaid funding will hurt
people with HIV.'"
97
 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
99 See IS
° See HIV Prevention Act Would Require HIV Reporting: AMA's Support of Coburn Bill Called
'Shocking, 'AIDS ALERT, May 1, 1997, at 54, available in 1997 WL 8961937; see also H.R. 1062,
105th Cong. (1997).
"° See H.R. 1062.
1 ° 1
 See id; Commentary, The Downside of the HIV Prevention Act, TAMPA -alp., May 18, 1997,
at 3.
192 See The Downside of the HIV Prevention Act, supra note 101, at 3.
193 See id.
1 " See H.R. 1062; The Downside of the HIV Prevention Act, supra note 101, at 3.
1°5 See The Downside of the HIV Prevention Act, supra note 101, at 3.
I" See id.
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Public response to the bill has been mixed.'" Comments by CDC
officials at the May 1997 meeting of their Advisory Committee for HIV
and STD Prevention suggest that they are concerned about the bill. 1 °8
The American Medical Association endorses the bill, but AIDS activists
criticize it as punitive and detrimental to existing HIV prevention
strategies.m° Public health agencies opposing the bill include the
American Public Health Association and the National Association of
County and City Health Officials.' 1 ° The National Alliance of State and
Territorial AIDS Directors estimates that the bill would precipitate 265
statutory or regulatory changes with which states would have to com-
ply."' Its sister group, the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, estimates that the bill would cost states $420 million a year
to implement, 12
5. The States and HIV Surveillance
A total of thirty-one states now require reporting of HIV cases,
either by name or by unique identifiers." 3 AIDS cases in these states,
however, account for less than one-third of the total AIDS cases, and
presumably HIV cases, in the country."' Many of the states and terri-
tories with a higher incidence of HIV and AIDS, such as California,
New York, Puerto Rico, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, do not re-
quire HIV surveillance."' Other states use anonymous HIV surveil-
107 See New Treatments Give HIV Reporting Added Weight: U.S. at 'Defining Moment' in History
of Epidemic, AIDS ALERT, July 1, 1997, at 80, available in 1997 WL 8961957 [hereinafter New
Treatments Give HIV Reporting Added Weight].
108 See id.
100 See id.
"° See id.
1 " See id.
"2 See New Theatments Give HIV Reporting Added Weight, supra note 107, at 80.
113 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121. New Mexico and Florida have
recently approved legislation adopting mandatory HIV reporting. See id. Three of those Si
states—Texas, Connecticut and Otegon—report names of only pediatric HIV cases, See id. Among
the states reporting HIV cases by name, 20' maintain the option of anonymous HIV testing. See
Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 2. Eight name reporting states do
not have anonymous testing available. See id.
114 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
"5 See Editorial, Keeping Rack of HIV Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1997, at A4 'hereinafter
Keeping nark of HIV Cases]. Of the states with the highest rates of reported AIDS cases in 1996,
only Florida, New Jersey and Louisiana require HIV surveillance. See Creating an Effective Public
Health Response, supra note 23, at 2, Massachusetts will he requiring HIV surveillance by unique
identifiers as scroll as au HIV reporting system is established. See Dolores Kong, State to Require
Reporting of HIV Cases but Massachusetts Breaks Ranks by Using Number Identifiers, Not Names,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 1998, at B4. California lawmakers are debating legislation to create a
five-year pilot project to track HIV cases using a unique identifier system. See California Nearing
Decision on Reporting by Coded ID, AIDS POL .Y & L. (LRP Publications, Horsham, PA), Sept. 4,
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lance, thereby reporting only general demographic and exposure
data." 6
III. THE TWO MAIN REPORTING SYSTEMS
A. Mandatory Name Reporting
In mandatory name reporting states, the names of individuals are
attached to the blood samples which are sent to laboratories for test-
ing. 117
 If individuals test positive for HIV, the laboratories report their
names to the state health department where their names are entered
into an HIV registry. 118 In January 1992, New Jersey became the first
high incidence state to adopt name-based HIV reporting. 119
 New Jer-
sey's mandatory reporting policy requires doctors to report the names
of people diagnosed with HIV to state health officials who are under
orders not to disclose these names.' 2° According to Douglas Morgan,
assistant commissioner in the New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services, officials do not believe that the policy has deterred
anyone from treatment. 121
 The state has also established fifteen sites
where people can be tested for HIV anonymously. 122 At these sites,
people are identified by a number rather than by name. 123 Anonymous
sites have identified about 1220 HIV-positive people since 1992, while
21,860 have been identified in doctors' offices, hospitals or clinics. 124
1998, at 7. Pennsylvania plans to require HIV surveillance but has not announced whether names
or unique identifiers will be used. See Most States Moving Toward HIV Reporting, but Methods Vary,
AIDS Pot.'Y & L. (LRP Publications, Horsham, PA), Mar. 20, 1998, at 5. The Governor of New
York has signed a partner notification bill that includes name-based reporting of HIV cases. See
New York Governor Signs Bill to Track HIV Cases by Name, AIDS PoCv & L. (LRP Publications,
Horsham, PA), July 24, 1998, at 1. Additionally, according to a survey completed February 19,
1998 by the National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, name-based reporting
systems are in various stages of planning in Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine
and New Hampshire. See Most States Moving Toward HIV Reporting, but Methods Vary, supra, at
4.
118
 Ste Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 2.
117 See AEGIS, supra note 32; CSTE & CDC, supra note 83.
118
 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 5.
119 See Anna Forbes, HIV InSite: Name Based HIV Case Reporting Fails in New Jersey—Why
Institute It in New York? [last modified Feb. 1998) Chttp://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/topics/testing/
2098.381b.honl>.
12° See Collins & King, supra note 79, at A2.
121 See is
In See id.
123 See id.
124 see id.
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B. Unique Identifier Reporting
Unique identifiers are numeric or alpha-numeric codes used to
identify individuals. 125 They are used every day in the form of social
security numbers, account numbers and drivers' license numbers. 126
For HIV testing, the goal is to create a code that identifies a person
and to associate the HIV test result with that code as opposed to the
name of that individual. 127 Numbers or letters represent data elements
which create a string code with a high degree of uniqueness that
theoretically matches only one individual. 129 The unique identifier can
then be reported to public health authorities and provide accurate
epidemiological data for Env infection rates along with demographic
indicators.' 29 The anonymity of the individual is preserved because the
code theoretically cannot be traced back to the person tested. 13°
Commentators note that different kinds of unique identifiers af-
ford different levels of privacy protection. 131 The least protective are
names and social security numbers.'" Although everybody has one,
names are not private and duplicates certainly exist.'" Social security
numbers were initially created to be a unique identifier solely for use
by the Social Security Administration, but now they are used quite
commonly, and therefore, offer little privacy.'"
In response to these privacy concerns, Maryland and Texas have
developed an innovative way to report HIV cases.' 35 They employ codes
comprised of data elements which include the last four digits of a social
security number, date of birth, a numeric code for race/ethnicity and
a numeric code for gender.'"
Maryland has used a unique identifier ("UI") system to conduct
HIV surveillance since 1994. 137 Its main objectives are to monitor I-IIV
123 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting supra note 53, at 10.
1'26 see id.
127 See id.
125 See For bes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 2-3.
129 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 10.
13° See id.
131 See Anna Forbes, Brief Overview of Some Unique Identifier System Alternatives (Sept. 18,
1997) Ghttp://hivitisite.ucsr.edu/topics/tcsting/2098.33bd.hutil > [hereinafter Forbes, Brief
Overview].
132 See id.
133 See id.
131 See id,
133 See GOStilk et al., supra note 17, at 1165.
136 See Forbes, Brief Overview, supra note 131. Similarly, New York's system for recording a
woman's identity on a Fetal Death Certificate includes first name, maiden name, date of birth,
gender and the last four digits of a Social Security number. See id.
137 See Michael Mains, ACLU AIDS Project: The Maryland Lesson: Conducting Effective HIV
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infection accurately throughout the state and to provide supplemental
case identification for AIDS and HIV-positive symptomatic cases.'" In
Maryland, all health care providers requesting HIV or CD4 tests are
required to assign unique identifier codes to testees, include the code
on the laboratory slip and record it in a surveillance log. 1" The log
matches the unique identifier to patient identifiers for purposes of case
investigation and follow-up."' Only laboratories licensed by Maryland,
however, are required to submit HIV reports to the state health depart-
ment."'
In Texas, the reporting of confirmed HIV infections by unique
identifier for adolescents and adults began in March 1994. 142 Although
Texas and Maryland both use the same data elements in their twelve
digit unique identifier codes, the two programs differ.'" In Texas, the
Surveillance with Unique Identifiers (last modified Dec. 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/
aidsinidnantereporthunl>. This system was implemented after attempts to institute HIV name
reporting were defeated in the legislature in 1992 and 1994. See id. The Maryland DeparUnent
of Health and Mental Hygiene established criteria for creating the current unique identifier
system. &Miura Forbes, A Brief Overview of the Unique Identifier System Used by the Maryland
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for HIV and CD Reporting, July 1997, at 1 (on file
with author). The system had to be simple to generate (i.e. not require access to a computer, not
take more than 90 seconds per code to generate and not require staff to make subjective
determinations), have data elements that are immutable, be generated from factual information
provided by the client, have a duplication rate no greater than 2%, not be easily "cracked" and
not depend on an individual's ability to recall and accurately report a previously assigned code.
See id.
1 s8 See Adams, supra note 137.
I"Set CDC, Evaluation of HIV Case Surveillance Through the Use of Non Name Unique Iden-
tifiers—Maryland and Texas, 1994-1996,46 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1259, 1255
(1998).
140 See id. The system proceeds through the following steps: (1) the provider orders the
laboratory test and creates the unique identifier, which is sent with the laboratory requisition;
(2) the laboratory then sends the UI Report Form for positive HIV tests and CD4 counts of fewer
than 200 to the State AIDS Administration office or to the local health department and forms
sent to the local health department are forwarded to the State AIDS Administration; (3) the AIDS
Administration matches each unique identifier received against the State AIDS Registry, which
has been coded with unique identifiers using the same 12-digit numbering system; (4) the AIDS
Adtninisuation then generates a list of non-matches to the State AIDS Registry, thereby creating
a list of cases of HIV infection that are not yet reportable as AIDS or HIV-positive symptomatic
cases in Maryland; (5) although the surveillance staff calls doctors as necessary to obtain addi-
tional patient information, such as clinical status and risk categories, patient names are not given
to this staff; (6) if, however, the patient is found to have an AIDS-defining illness or is HIV
symptomatic (a reportable condition in Maryland), then the staff will obtain information, includ-
ing the patient's name, which is used to create an AIDS case report. See Adams, supra note 137.
141 SeeCDC, supra note 139, at 1255. Non-state residents, people who are tested at anonymous
test sites, donors of blood, semen or tissue and participants of certain research projects, are
exempted from reporting requirements. See id. at 1254.
142 See BUREAU or HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 7. Confirmed HW infections
in children 12 years of age and younger are reported by name. See id. at 7 11.1.
145 See BUREAU or HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 15; CDC, supra note 139, at
1255.
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reporting system is a dual system, with both physicians and laboratories
required to report confirmed HIV infection.'" In addition to providing
unique identifier information, they are also required to report test
type, test date, test result, zip code, city and county of residence of the
infected individual and name and address of the provider or laboratory
reporting the infection." 5 The Texas system, however, does not require
physicians to keep a log or its equivalent. 146 Additionally, there are no
reporting exemptions. 147
Commentators argue that , the unique identifiers that are most
protective of privacy incorporate a private data element into the mix
of public data used to produce the code. 148 A couple of these systems
have been created in connection with HIV reporting. 1 A9
 For example,
in 1992, Philadelphia field tested a locally developed system called
Client Key.'" The code, which is created by the service provider, is
comprised of the individual's name, date of birth, gender and a key
word or phrase selected by the client. 151
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL. ISSUES FOR HIV REPORTING SCHEMES
A. The Right to Privacy Claims
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the right of privacy vis-a-vis mandatory HIV reporting pro-
grams. The Court has addressed, however, the scope of the state's
144 See Bumin or HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 7. The Texas Department of
Health recently reported that an analysis of the state's unique identifier system reveals that the
system does not provide reliable and accurate data on the number of HIV-infected individuals in
Texas. See id. at 14. Because of these shortcomings, the Texas Bureau of HIV and STD Prevention
is considering moving to a name-based HIV reporting system. See id. at 15.
145 See id. at 7.
145 See CDC, supra note 139, at 1256.
147 See id. at 1254.
148 See Forbes, Brief Overview, supra note 131.
149 See id.
150 See id, Another system called DoubleLock was invented in Philadelphia by the creators of
Client Key, but has yet to be tested. See id. The code, created by the services provider, would be
comprised of a name, date of birth, gender and a standardized measurement of hand-size ratio.
See id. Because the DoubleLock scrambles the public record data elements together with a
verifiable, non-public record data element (the hand-size ratio measurement) during the com-
puter encryption process, the tisk of client identities later being traced du ough cross-matching
is greatly eliminated. See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 3. The public record data
elements cannot be unscrambled or re-isolated without lutowledge of the private data clement
(which is provided with the client's consent and participation only). See id. Although it is
theoretically possible to learn client identities by cross-matching a list of DoubleLock codes
against codes generated by the encryption of a secondary, public record database, this would be
extremely difficult and would require great amounts of computer time. See id. at 4.
151 See Forbes, Brief Overview, supra note 131.
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police power to protect the public.'" In 1905, in Jacobsen v. Massachu-
setts, the Court held that a statute requiring smallpox vaccination of
adults did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.'" In Jacobsen, the plaintiff claimed that a statute's smallpox vacci-
nation requirement violated the preamble to the Constitution, the
Fourteenth Amendment and the spirit of the Constitution.' 51 The
Court recognized the state's authority to enact various quarantine and
health laws.' 55 The Court also noted the state's need to restrict an
individual's liberty to secure the general comfort, health and prosper-
ity of its people.'"Weighing the state police power to protect the public
against the rights of the individual, the Court determined that protect-
ing the public against a potential smallpox epidemic outweighed the
individual's right to refuse the vaccination because the vaccination was
a reasonable means to prevent the spread of a dangerous epidemic.'"
Thus, the Court upheld the compulsory vaccination statute as consti-
tutional.'"
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme
Court held that a Connecticut statute which prohibited the use of
contraception by a married couple violated their constitutional right
of privacy.'" In Griswold, Planned Parenthood League's executive di-
rector and medical director, who had been convicted as accessories for
informing, instructing and advising married couples on preventing
conception, alleged that the Connecticut law forbidding use of contra-
ceptives violated the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The Court first noted
the intimate relationship between a husband and wife and their phy-
sician's role in at least one aspect of that relationship.' 6 ' The Court
then noted that the association of people is neither mentioned in
the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights. 162
 The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments created a "penumbra" where privacy is protected from govern-
mental intrusion.'" Balancing the individual's privacy interest against
162 Ste Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
I 53 /d. at 12, 13, 14, 39.
154 See id. at 13-14.
155 See id. at 25.
156 See id. at 26.
157 See Jacobsen, 197 U.S. at 30-31.
158 See id. at 39.
159 381 U.S. 479, 480, 486 (1965).
'60 See id. at 480.
161 See id. at 482.
162 See id
'63 See id at 484-85. Concerning the First Amendment, the Court noted that the right to
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the state's police power to invade the marital bedroom, the Court
determined that the law was an unjustified governmental intrusion
because the law swept unnecessarily into an area of protected free-
doms.'" Thus, the Court held that the Connecticut statute prohibiting
the use of contraception by a married couple violated the constitu-
tional right to privacy.' 69
In 1977, in Whalen v. Rae, the United States Supreme Court held
that a New York statute, which required physicians to identify patients
obtaining certain prescription drugs, did not violate the patients' con-
stitutional right to privacy.' 66 In Whalen, patients and physicians sought
to enjoin enforcement of a statute that required physicians to forward
copies of prescriptions for certain drugs to the state health department
for entry into the state's centralized computer file. 161 The Court deter-
mined that the statute was a reasonable exercise of the state's broad
police powers by recognizing the state's vital interest in controlling the
distribution of dangerous drugs.' 68 The Court also noted that there was
no basis for assuming that the security provisions of the statute would
be improperly administered.' 69 Additionally, the Court identified two
dimensions of the constitutional right to privacy: the individual interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and the interest in making
certain kinds of important decisions without governmental interfer-
ence. 170
Although the Court acknowledged that some individuals may
avoid or postpone needed medical attention due to concerns of privacy
and stigmatization, the Court reasoned that disclosing private medical
information to state representatives does not automatically amount to
freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but also the right
to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read, the freedom of inquiry, the freedom. of thought
and the freedom to teach. See id. at 482. The Court reasoned that the right of association, more
than merely the right to attend a meeting, includes the right to express one's attitudes or
philosophies by membership in a group, by affiliation with such a group or by other lawful means.
See id. at 483. The Court then noted that the Third Amendment's prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of privacy. See id. at 484. The Court emphasized that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
have been described as protection against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life." Id. The Court also noted that the Ninth Amendment provides
that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights retained by the people. See id.
164 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
165 See id. at 480, 486.
166 429 U.S. 589, 595, 605-04 (1977).
167 See id. at 591, 595.
I" See id. at 598.
169 See id. at 601.
179 See id. at 598-600.
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an impermissible invasion of privacy because patients often disclose
this information to their health care providers."' The Court recog-
nized, for example, that reporting requirements relating to venereal
disease, child abuse, injuries caused by deadly weapons and certifica-
tions of fetal death could be justified because disclosing private medi-
cal information is often essential to modern medical practice, even
though the disclosure could reflect unfavorably on the patient's char-
acter. 172
 Furthermore, the Court noted that the New York statute did
not deprive the public of access to drugs because it neither prohibited
the use of the drugs nor conditioned access to the drugs on the
consent of any state official.'" After balancing these issues against the
state's interest, the Court determined that the statute's patient-iden-
tification requirements did not threaten the patients' privacy rights
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation." 4
The opinion concluded by describing the issues that the Court did
not decide.'" The Court noted that the government's duty to avoid
disclosure arguably has its root in the Constitution.'" The Court also
stated that it was not deciding any issue presented by the unwarranted
disclosure of accumulated private data, whether intentional or unin-
tentional, or by a system that did not contain comparable security
provisions.'" These considerations notwithstanding, the Court held
that the New York statute did not violate the patients' constitutional
right to privacy.' 78
In 1980, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health's ("NIOSH") access to the
medical records of certain employees did not violate the employees'
constitutional right to privacy. 179 In Westinghouse, NIOSH sought access
to medical records of Westinghouse employees who were potentially
exposed to dangerous chemicals in the plant.I 8° Recognizing that in-
formation concerning one's body has a special character, the court
reasoned that medical records which may contain intimate facts of a
171 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
171
 See id.
17!
	 id. at 603.
174 See id. at 600.
175 See id. at 605.
176
 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
177 See id. at 605-06.
176 See id. at 603-04.
176 638 F.2d 570,580 (3d Ch. 1980).
150 See id. at 573.
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personal nature fall within a zone of privacy entitled to protection."'
The court noted, however, that intrusion into the zone of privacy
surrounding medical records is permitted if the societal interest in dis-
closure outweighs the privacy interest at hand. 182 The court identified
seven factors to be weighed in deciding whether an intrusion into
an individual's privacy is justified: (1) the type of record requested;
(2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from
disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated;
(5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure;
(6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express
statutory mandate, articulated public policy or other recognizable pub-
lic interest militating toward access.'"
After balancing these factors, the court concluded that the strong
public interest in occupational safety and health, the fact that the re-
cords were reasonably relevant to NIOSH's inquiry and the effective
security provisions against subsequent unauthorized disclosure justi-
fied the intrusion into the employees' medical records.' 84 Thus, the
Third Circuit held that NIOSH's access to certain employees' medical
records did not violate the employees' constitutional right to privacy.' 86
In 1990, in Doe v. Borough of Barrington, the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey held that a police officer's disclo-
sure of an individual's AIDS condition violated the individual's and his
family's constitutional right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 186 In Borough of Barrington, the plaintiffs alleged that they suf-
fered harassment, discrimination and humiliation because a police
officer disclosed to neighbors that "Mr. Doe" had AIDS."' The court
noted that the members of the family had a constitutional right to
privacy in the information due to its sensitive medical nature.' 88 The
court reasoned that the privacy interest in one's exposure to AIDS is
greater than the privacy interest in other medical records because of
the stigma that attaches to the disease. 182 Recognizing that an individ-
ual's privacy interest in medical information and records is not abso-
181 See id. at 577.
182 See id. at 578.
188 See id.
184 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579, 580.
in See id. at 580.
"56 729 F. Stipp. 376, 378, 385 (D. NJ. 1990).
187 See id. at 378-79.
188 See id. at 384, 385.
189 See id. at 384.
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lute, the court reasoned that the government must show a compelling
state interest in breaching that privacy.'" The court determined that
disclosure of Doe's confidential information did not advance a com-
pelling governmental interest in preventing the spread of the disease
because there was no risk that the neighbors might be exposed to the
HIV virus through casual contact with Doe's wife. 19 ' Thus, the New
Jersey federal court held that the police officer's disclosure about an
individual's AIDS condition violated the constitutional right of pri-
vacy.' 92
In 1994, in Doe v. City of New York, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that individuals have a constitu-
tional right to privacy in their HIV status.' 93
 In City of New York, the
plaintiff alleged that his right to privacy was violated when the City of
New York publicly revealed details of a discrimination claim settlement
against Delta Airlines based on his HIV-positive status. 194 The court
reasoned that the right to privacy includes an individual's right to avoid
disclosure about his or her health because of its personal nature.' 96 The
court noted that this is especially true for individuals infected with HIV
or AIDS because revealing their HIV status potentially exposes them
to discrimination and intolerance.' 96
 Thus, the Second Circuit held
that there is a constitutional right to confidentiality in one's HIV
status. 197
In 1994, in Doe v. Wigginton, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the disclosure to corrections officers of
a prisoner's HIV status did not violate the prisoner's constitutional
right to privacy.' 98 In Wigginton, a prisoner alleged that his constitu-
tional right to privacy was violated when a prison officer observed a
medical file indicating that the prisoner was HIV-positive.' 99 The court
noted that recognizing a constitutional right of nondisclosure would
force courts to balance almost every act of government against its
intrusion on a vague concept of privacy. 2" The court also noted that
inferring broad constitutional rights where the Constitution does not
190 See id. at 385.
10 ' See Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 385.
192 See id.
193
 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994).
1 " See id. at 265-66.
193 See id. at 267.
196
 See id
1 " See id.
19821 F.3d 733, 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1994).
' 99 See id at 735.
200 See id. at 740.
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explicitly mention them is inappropriate for the judiciary.201 Thus,
reasoning that the Constitution does not encompass a general right to
nondisclosure of private information, the Sixth Circuit held that there
was no violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights. 2° 2
B. Equal Protection Claims
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment man-
dates that states treat similarly situated people in a similar way. 2°3 Al-
though the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit state legislatures
from making classifications, it does require that such classifications be
based on permissible, and not invidious, grounds. 204 The United States
Supreme Court has formulated three standards of review for equal
protection claims: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and a rational
basis test. 205 The nature of the allegedly discriminatory classification
determines the standard used. 206
In 1984, in Palmore v. Sidoti, the United States Supreme Court held
that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and must be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest to
comport with the Equal Protection Clause. 207 In Palmore, a white man
was awarded custody of his three-year-old daughter after the white,
natural mother remarried a black mati.209 The Supreme Court noted
that the lower court based its custody decision wholly on race because
the natural mother is ordinarily. allowed to retain custody of her child
after a remarriage. 209 The Court determined that the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to abolish the historic discrimination of
people based on their race."' The Court reasoned that classifying
people according to race is more likely to result in a classificatiori based
on racial prejudice than on legitimate public concerns because the
race, and not the person, dictates the category. 2 " Thus, the Court held
that private racial biases and their effects are impermissible criteria in
201 See id.
202 See id.
20 See Lim:151,7 v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 83 (1911).
204 See id. at 78, 83.
205 See generally joinr E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 19.3, at
573-90 (4th ed. 1991).
206 See id.
207 966 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1989).
205 See id. at 430-31.
209 See id. at 432.
210 See id,
211 See id.
1196	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 39:1175
custody decisions. 212 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and must be necessary to
the accomplishment of compelling governmental interests. 213
In 1982, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the United
States Supreme Court held that sex classifications are subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny and must substantially relate to important govern-
mental objectives in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. 214 In
Hogan, Mississippi University's School of Nursing denied admission to
a male student because of his sex. 2 ' 3 The Court reasoned that a height-
ened level of scrutiny was necessary because gender-based classifica-
tions have not only been the product of fixed stereotypes regarding
the proper roles and abilities of men and women, but also have re-
sulted in unequal treatment. 216
 The Court noted that the single-sex
admissions policy neither assisted anyone who was disadvantaged nor
offered opportunities to anyone who had faced restrictions based on
arbitrary categorizations. 217 Thus, the Supreme Court held that gender-
based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny and must
substantially relate to an important governmental objective. 218
In 1996, in Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court held
that a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting preferential
treatment for homosexuals was subject to a rational basis test and thus,
must be rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest in
order to comport with the Equal Protection Clause. 2 '3 In Romer, the
plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of Amendment Two to the
Colorado constitution, which prohibited any legislative, judicial or civil
rights protections for homosexuals, claiming that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" The Court noted
that, when neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is impli-
cated, a legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational re-
lation to some legitimate state interest. 221 The Court then considered
the state's claim that it was protecting its citizens' First Amendment
212 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 934,
2" See id. at 432-33.
214 456 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
216 See id. at 720-21.
216 See id. at 725-26. The Court noted that women me not discriminated against in the field
of nursing and that the university allowed men to audit classes but prevented them from earning
credits. See id. at 729, 731.
2" See id. at 728, 729.
218 See id. at 724.
219 517 U.S. 620, 624, 631-32 (1996).
220 See id. at 624-25.
221 See id. at 631.
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freedoms but determined that the Colorado amendment did not ra-
tionally comport with the state's justification. 222 The Court noted that
the state's amendment imposed serious disabilities on a single group of
citizens, inflicting on them immediate, continuing and real injuries
that belied any legitimate justifications. 223 The Court determined,
therefore, that the Colorado amendment's rationale could only have
been motivated by animosity toward homosexuals.224 Reasoning that
the Constitution does not tolerate mere animus as a rational basis for
a law that seeks to disadvantage a political class, the Court held that
Amendment Two—in rendering homosexuals unequal to everyone
else—violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2"
C. Recent Right to Privacy and Equal Protection Claims
In 1997, in In re Adams, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a bankruptcy statute requiring
disclosure of a social security number on court documents did not
violate the individual's constitutional right to privacy or equal protec-
tion.226 In Adams, the appellant alleged that the bankruptcy code sec-
tion requiring a bankruptcy petition preparer to disclose a social secu-
rity number on documents violated her constitutional right to privacy
and equal protection.227 The court first noted that the constitutional
right of privacy includes non-disclosure of personal matters. 228 The
court then rioted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals previously
held that the constitutional right of privacy does not prohibit disclo-
sure of unlisted telephone numbers through "Caller ID" service, but
that the right of privacy does protect information regarding an indi-
vidual's HIV status or AIDS diagnoses. 229 The court reasoned that a
social security number is more akin to a telephone number than to an
HIV or AIDS diagnosis and that revealing a social security number on
court documents does not interfere with the most basic decisions about
family, parenthood or bodily integrity.2" Thus, although the court
recognized that there were no administrative or statutory safeguards
against publicly disseminating a petition preparer's social security num-
222 See id. at 655.
229 See id.
224 See Romer, 517 U,S, at 632,
225 See id. at 694-35.
226 214 B,R. 212, 214, 219 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1997).
227 See id. at 214, 215.
229 See id. at 216.
229 See id.
2" See
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ber, the court held that there is no fundamental privacy right prohib-
iting disclosure of social security numbers."'
The court then addressed appellant's claim that the statute vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because bankruptcy trustees and
debtors' attorneys are not required to use their social security numbers
when documenting public records. 232
 The court first determined that
the bankruptcy statute does not employ an inherently invidious clas-
sification scheme because it does not classify by race or gender. 233 The
court also reasoned that the statute does not impinge on any funda-
mental rights because it does not violate the right to privacy and the
right to pursue a profession as a bankruptcy petition preparer is not a
fundamental right."' Therefore, the court concluded that there need
only he a rational relation between the classification and legitimate
governmental objectives. 235
 The court determined that the purpose of
the statute—preventing abuse by non-lawyer petition preparers—is
legitimate, especially because bankruptcy trustees and attorneys are
highly regulated."' Thus, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel held that
the bankruptcy statute requiring disclosure of an individual's social
security number did not violate the individual's right to privacy or
guarantee of equal protection. 237
In 1998, in Middlebrooks v. State Board of Health, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that Alabama's mandatory name reporting
statute for certain diseases and health conditions, including HIV and
AIDS, did not violate the individual's right to privacy or the physician's
right to equal protection. 238 In Middlebrooks, the State Board of Health
filed suit against a physician to compel him to disclose the names and
addresses of his HIV and AIDS patients, as required by its rules and
the reporting statute. 239
 The physician argued that the statutory and
regulatory scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because he was required to report the names and
addresses of his HIV and AIDS patients, while those who sell confiden-
tial HIV-testing kits and out-of-state laboratories that evaluate the test
results are not obligated to do the same.24° Concerning the right of
23 t See Adams, 214 13.R. at 217.
232
 See id.
233
 See id. at 218.
234 See id.
235 See id.
235 See Adams, 214 B.R. at 218.
2" See id. at 214, 219.
232 710 So. 2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1998).
2" See id. at 892.
2" See id
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privacy in medical information relating to HIV and AIDS, the court
weighed the Westinghouse factors and determined that preventing the
spread of HIV and AIDS is a legitimate governmental interest. 2'l The
court also noted that adequate safeguards existed to protect the medi-
cal records from unauthorized disclosure."' The court reasoned that
the state can require disclosure to state representatives who are respon-
sible for the health of the community, and thus concluded that the
statute's disclosure requirements did not impermissibly invade pri-
vacy.'" In addressing the equal protection challenge, the court deter-
mined that the state's classification was reasonable because the out-of-
state testing labs that analyze the results of the testing kits and vendors
of the testing kits are not similarly situated to physicians who regularly
treat HIV and AIDS patients. 2A" The court emphasized that out-of-state
testing labs do not know the identity of the persons being tested and
the vendors of the testing kits have no information on whether a
particular individual is HIV- or AIDS-positive, whereas physicians do
obtain this information, 2` 5 Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court held that
Alabama's reporting statute, requiring physicians to disclose the names
of their HIV- and AIDS-infected patients to the State Board of Health,
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.'"
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF HIV REPORTING SCHEMES
A. The Right to Privacy in One's HIV Status
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
privacy.2'7 The Court has struggled, however, with defining the scope
of that right. 2'8 This is especially true in the area of informational
privacy.'" In Whalen, for example, the Supreme Court recognized a
right to privacy in personal medical information but never clearly held
that the information had explicit constitutional protection.'" Thus,
while sonic lower courts have embraced the existence of a constitu-
241 See id. at 892-93.
242 See id. at 893.
245
 See Middlebrooks, 710 So. 2c1 at 893.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 893 n.3.
246 See id. at 893.
247 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
245 See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
250 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 605 (1977).
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tional right to privacy in personal information, others have rejected or
questioned it. 251
Numerous courts, however, have interpreted Whalen as extending
the constitutional right to privacy to two interests: ( 1) the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and (2) the interest
in making certain kinds of important decisions independently. 252 The
privacy interest asserted in mandatory name reporting programs falls
within the first category referred to in Whalen—the right not to have
an individual's private affairs made public by the government. 255
 This
right of privacy may, therefore, be characterized as a right to confiden-
tiality. 254
An individual's medical records should fall within the array of
materials entitled to privacy protection because information about
one's body and state of health is a matter which the individual is
ordinarily allowed to retain privately. 255
 The status of an individual's
health is very personal and there are few matters over which an indi-
vidual would prefer to maintain contro1. 256
 Therefore, an individual's
choice to inform others that he or she has contracted a fatal or incur-
able disease is one that the individual should be allowed to make. 257
Considering society's moral judgments about high-risk activities asso-
ciated with AIDS, HIV-related information may be even more personal
than other medical conditions. 258
 Because HIV-positive individuals are
often stereotyped as drug users or homosexuals, revealing HIV status
potentially exposes an individual to stigmatization, discrimination and
intolerance. 259
 Thus, an individual's HIV status is more intimate than
the prescription drug usage considered in Wha/en.26° Because the Su-
preme Court in Whalen recognized the privacy interest in medical
information relating to prescriptions, the right to privacy in one's HIV
status should fall within one of the zones of privacy entitled to consti-
tutional protection. 261
251
 See, e.g., Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994); Doe v. City of New York, 15
F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980); Doc v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 387 (D. N.J. 1990).
2" See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Westinghouse, 638
F.2d at 577.
253 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599.
454
	 City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267.
255 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
256 See City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267.
2" See id.
258
 See id.; Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Stipp. at 384.
259
 See City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 384.
210 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599; supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
201 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599; City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
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Additionally, although the court in Wigginton held that there is no
constitutional right to nondisclosure of private information, the case
involved a prisoner. 262 Even though the court did not explicitly address
privacy in the context of prisoner's rights, Wigginton can be factually
distinguished because prisoners are afforded fewer privacy rights than
the general public. 263 Thus, despite the holding in Wigginton, other
cases such as Borough of Barrington and City of New York suggest that
the right to privacy in one's HIV status should fall within a constitu-
tional zone of privacy. 264
Nondisclosure of one's HIV status, however, is not a fundamental
right deserving strict scrutiny.265 The Supreme Court has determined
that privacy rights relating to areas of marriage, procreation and child-
rearing are fundamenta1. 266 The Supreme Court in Whalen, however,
never stated that the privacy interest in medical information is funda-
mental and did not use a strict scrutiny test. 267 Rather, the Whalen Court
used a balancing test, thereby implicitly reasoning that the privacy
interest at issue was not fundamenta1. 268 That is, the privacy right in
HIV status is not a right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
nor a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" to the same extent as
262 See Wigginton, 21 F.3d at 735, 740.
263 See id. at 740; Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 11.10 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
264 See Wigginton, 21 F.3d at 740; City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Borough of Barrington, 729
F. Supp. at 385. It is possible that a court would not find any constitutional right to privacy in
one's HIV status. See Wigginton, 21 F.Sd at 740. Some courts reject the notion that the Constitution
protects against the disclosure of private information. See, e.g., id Because virtually every govern-
mental action could be challenged as interfering with personal privacy to some degree, some
courts slate that recognizing a right to nondisclosure of private information would compel courts
to balance every government action against its inu . usion on individual privacy. See id. Additionally,
some courts might not want to infer very broad constitutional rights where the Constitution does
not explicitly provide them, refusing to expand upon the Court's ruling in Griswold See 381 U.S.
at 486; Wigginton, 21 F.3d at 740. In Whalen, the Court indicated that the government's duty to
avoid disclosing personal information only arguably has its roots in the Constitution. 429 U.S. at
605. Absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court, courts might not be willing to construe
isolated statements in Whalen broadly and thus might conclude that there is no general right to
nondisclosure of private information. See id.; Wigginton, 21 F.Sd at 740.
265 See infra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., Loving , v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahozna
ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1943) (right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S, 510, 535 (1925) (right to child, eating). In considering equal protection claims, the Supreme
Court has also recognized as fundamental the right to vote, the right to travel and the right to
access the courts, See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (right to travel); Harper
v, 'Virginia State Bd., 385 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (tight to vote); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
452 (1963) (right to access courts).
267 See generally Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-604.
265 See id.
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marriage, procreation and childrearing. 269 Given that the Supreme
Court has indicated that it will not expand the number of fundamental
rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause beyond those currently
recognized, nondisclosure of one's HIV status is not a fundamental
right. 2"
Although the right to privacy and confidentiality in medical re-
cords exists, the right is not absolute. 271 In Whalen, the Court estab-
lished that limited reporting requirements for public health purposes
generally will not violate the constitutional right to privacy if the infor-
mation is reasonably related to a valid public health purpose, if access
to the information is limited to public health departments and their
officials and if the reporting scheme has strict confidentiality protec-
tions. 272 The Court also specified that reporting requirements relating
to venereal disease, child abuse, injuries caused by deadly weapons and
certifications of fetal death could be justified even though disclosure
could reflect unfavorably on the patient's character. 273
To determine if a right to privacy has been violated, courts have
balanced the individual's right to privacy against the government's
interest in obtaining personal data and the public's interest in disclos-
ing the information."' The Westinghouse balancing test is the most
appropriate test for determining whether an invasion into an individ-
ual's records is justified because the factors enumerated in Westing-
house are comprehensive and concretely encompass the reasoning of
Whalen.275
 Additionally, courts that adopt the Westinghouse test will be
more consistent in their decisions, thus making it more likely that
similar facts will result in similar outcomes. 276 This is crucial in right to
informational privacy cases which are, by their nature, quite fact spe-
cific. 277
 Moreover, the specific nature of the Westinghouse factors will
allow individuals and legislatures to know what criteria the courts will
employ in determining whether there has been a violation and thus
262 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934); City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; see also supra note 303 and accompanying text.
27° See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
271 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578; Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 385.
272 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04; Mar k Barnes, Confidentiality, in AIDS LEGAL GUIDE 4-1,
4-2 (2d ed. 1987).
27!
	 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602.
274 See, e.g., Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
27S
	 Whaler:, 429 U.S. at 599-604; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
276 See, e.g., City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578; Middlebt oaks v.
State Bd. of Health, 710 So. 2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1998).
277 See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06.
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allow both individuals to gauge their actions and legislatures to assess
the constitutionality of proposed laws.'"
Applying the Westinghouse factors, a mandatory name reporting
system does not violate an individual's constitutional right to privacy. 2"
The first two Westinghouse factors involve the type of record requested
and the information disclosed. 280 Reports submitted to state health
departments under mandatory name reporting programs contain pa-
tient identification, by name, for HIV-positive test results. 281 As dis-
cussed infra, the Constitution protects the confidentiality of this type
of medical information. 282
The third and fourth Westinghouse factors are the potential for
harm from disclosure and the injury resulting from the disclosure. 288
The disclosure of one's HIV status by mandatory name reporting could
result in substantial harm, given the social stigma attached to the
disease. 281 This stigma makes the privacy interest in the exposure to the
virus greater than one's privacy interest in ordinary medical records. 2n
HIV status is information of a most personal nature given society's
negative moral judgments about the high-risk activities associated with
the disease, including sexual activity and drug use. 286 Thus, the poten-
tial for harassment and discrimination increases greatly with disclo-
sure. 287
Furthermore, the stigma not only attaches to the individual with
HIV, but may reach to others around the HIV-positive individual. 288
Disclosure about HIV status violates a family's privacy more than dis-
closures relating to other aspects of family medical history. 289 Revealing
that one's family member is HIV-positive may cause the entire family
to be ostracized. 2" Furthermore, because those sharing a household
with an infected person suffer from disclosure just as the victim does,
the right to privacy in this information may extend to members of the
278 See, e.g„ City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267; Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578; Middlebrooks, 710
So. 2d at 893.
279 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578; infra notes 280-343 and accompanying text.
211° See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
281 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra Dote 23, at 2.
282 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 577.
2" See id. at 578.
284 See Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 384.
288
	 id.
288
	 id.
287 See id.
288
	 id.
289
	 Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 385.
290 See id.
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infected individual's immediate family."' The stigma associated with
HIV may even attach to others in contact with HIV-positive individuals,
such as doctors, and to those in high-risk groups who do not have the
disease.292
In Borough of Barrington, the court recognized the substantial risks
of breaches in confidentiality regarding an individual's AIDS condi-
tion.293
 Unauthorized disclosure of HIV status, however, is even more
significant than disclosure of AIDS status because an HIV-positive in-
dividual is reported earlier in the course of infection, lives longer after
being reported and is more likely to be employed.'" Given that the
court in City of New York recognized that revealing an individual's HIV
status potentially exposes the individual to discrimination and intoler-
ance, a court should find that there is great potential for harm from
disclosure in a mandatory name reporting program."'
Although the potential for harm from disclosure of HIV status is
great, no actual injury may result from the mere collection of HIV
surveillance data."6
 The individual interest in protecting the privacy of
HIV status seems significantly less important where the information is
collected but not publicly disseminated. 297 To date, no court has found
a violation of the constitutional right to privacy where information has
been collected by the government but not disseminated."'
The fifth Westinghouse factor involves the adequacy of the safe-
guards against unauthorized disclosure.'" With mandatory name re-
porting, agencies may not be able to control how authorized personnel
use the data to which they have access, thereby creating a risk of either
inadvertent or intentional breaches of confidentiality.'" Because fed-
eral, state and local public health administrators, HIV-related social
service and medical professionals, and field service staff have access to
the names of HIV-infected individuals, the reported names could be
used for inappropriate purposes."' For example, in Florida, a com-
puter disk with the names of 4000 people with AIDS was found in the
parking lot of a bar."' This disk apparently belonged to an AIDS
291 See id
"2 See id. at 884.
295 See id.
"I See BUREAU OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 18.
895 See City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267.
296 See id.; infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
2" See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Department of Hons. and Urban
Dcv., 118 F.3d 786,798 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
298
 See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04; American Fed'n of Gao t Employees, 118 F.3d at 793.
299 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
266 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 8.
"I See id.
882 See IS
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surveillance case worker who misplaced it." In New York, a log with
the names of 500 people who were tested for HIV disappeared from a
clinic.'" Similarly, the FBI has admitted using improperly-obtained HIV
information, and other law enforcement agencies have both disclosed
HIV status to neighbors or prison inmates and have broadcasted the
names of HIV-infected individuals over police radios. 305
Additionally, present legal assurances of confidentiality might not
prevent later problems with privacy. 306 State privacy laws are only as
strong as the legislature's will to uphold them.307 A legislature that
enacts confidentiality provisions may later create exceptions or revoke
protections." Furthermore, health departments could be compelled
by legislative or legal mandate to surrender the names of NW-infected
individuals for non-surveillance purposes." For instance, in 1991, Illi-
nois passed a law that directed the Department of Health to identify
all HIV-infected health care workers by comparing the state's confiden-
tial lists of HIV-positive individuals against records of health care li-
censes. 310 Patients of health care workers who were infected with HIV
and who engaged in invasive medical procedures, including surgery,
were to be contacted. 3 " Although the law was never implemented, it
shows the potentially precarious nature of confidentiality guarantees. 312
Moreover, in Virginia, state HIV registry information was obtained by
subpoena and used by a grand jury to bring multiple counts of at-
tempted murder against two female prostitutes in 1993. 313 In Colorado,
the names of unlocated HIV-infected individuals are turned over to the
Department of Motor Vehicles for assistance in locating them.'" Fur-
thermore, on September 11, 1997, United States Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna Shalala recommended to Congress that po-
303 See id.
3°4 See id.
3°3 See HIV Surveillance and Name RepOrting, supra note 53, at 8.
3" See id.
3°7 Anna Forbes, Myths and Facts About HIV Case Reporting By Name Versus By Unique
Identifier (visited Sept. 1997) <http://hivinsite.ucsf.eclu/topics/testing/2098.33bc.html > [here-
inafter Forbes, Myths fe' Facts].
308 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 9.
309 Fred Dillon, HIV InSite: Primary Arguments Used Against Mandatory Names Reporting
(visited Jan. 4, 1998) Clutp://hivinsitemcsfedu/topics/testing/2098.33b5.html>.
310 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 9. ,
311 See id.
312 See id.
313 See Anna Forbes, Address at the National AIDS Update Conference (Mar. 22, 1996).
Author ities used positive HIV status to bring attempted murder charges in 1995 against a North
Dakota woman after she reported having been raped while unconscious. Since 1988, North
Dakota has had mandatory HIV name reporting. See id.
914 See a
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lice and other law enforcement officials have access to private medical
records on request."6 If this is passed into law, legal access to name-
based HIV registries may be possible. 316
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized that
security precautions are never foolproof and does not presume the
measures are insufficient if there are reasonable devices in place to
secure confidentiality. 917
 In Whalen, the Court stated that fear of public
disclosure could cause some patients to decline prescriptions that were
medically necessary. 313
 The Court noted, however, that the state had
enacted security provisions to protect the patients' privacy and that
there was no evidence that the security provisions were inadequate. 319
The Court reasoned that unsubstantiated fear of public disclosure was
not sufficient to invalidate the statute.32° Thus, if there are reasonable
devices to secure the confidentiality of records, the Court will not
assume that the devices will prove insufficient."' As a result, if states
take measures to ensure that HIV status reports are maintained under
secure conditions, the patients have diminished privacy interests be-
cause public dissemination is less likely. 322
 Therefore, the fear of un-
authorized public disclosure that might discourage some individuals
from getting tested will not be sufficient to invalidate mandatory name
reporting. 3"
The sixth and seventh Westinghouse factors involve the need for
access and whether there is statutory authority or public interest favor-
ing access to the information."' Disease surveillance plays a vital role
in public health because it provides information needed to identify,
track and respond to disease trends effectively and timely. 326 Therefore,
the availability of accurate, reliable and complete data is critical to
protecting and maintaining the health of the community. 326
Because AIDS reporting does not provide an accurate reflection
of HIV cases, the public clearly has a strong interest in further research
regarding the epidemic.227
 The advantages of tracking and profiling
313 Set Forbes, Myths ee Facts, supra note 307, at 1.
316 See id.
317 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601-02.
316 See id. at 602.
313
 See id. at 601,
3" See id. at 602.
321 See id. at 601-02.
322 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601-02.
323 See id. at 602.
324 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
325 See BUREAU OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 4.
326 See id.
327 See Sophia Kwong, HIV InSite: Primary Arguments Used in Support of Mandatory Names
Reporting (visited Jan. 4, 1998) Chttp://hivinsite.ucsf.edu/topics/testing/2098.33b6.htlitl >.
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HIV are significant because HIV infection marks the beginning of the
disease process rather than the end. 328 Due to new treatments which
delay the onset of AIDS, states that rely on AIDS surveillance informa-
tion to target HIV prevention efforts will have a distorted picture of
HIV-infected populations.'" Thus, because HIV reporting programs
will increase and improve HIV surveillance efforts and data, the need
for HIV surveillance data is virtually undisputed."°
Whether obtaining this needed data through name reporting is
necessary, however, is hotly debated."' Some argue that access to
names will enable public health authorities to ensure that information
about medical and social services is offered to individuals who test
positive. 392 Collecting names, however, will not provide everyone with
care when money to pay for the care is not available."' From 1996
through early 1997, only twenty-five percent of individuals with CDC-
defined AIDS were on any kind of protease inhibitor therapy.'" The
federally funded AIDS Drug Assistance Programs ("ADAP") obtained
medication for only fourteen to twenty-eight percent of all ADAP
eligible people in 1996. 3"
Some public health officials argue that mandatory name reporting
will facilitate partner notification programs and expand access to test-
ing, by allowing public health authorities to contact individuals who
test positive and work with them to inform at-risk partners about testing
services." It seems, however, that partner notification should not be
tied to the issue of mandatory name reporting. 337 The name of the
individual who tests positive is not needed to elicit the names of sex
and needle-sharing partners for partner notification."a Of the HIV-
positive people surveyed in the MESH study, those who tested at sites
where names were not used supplied the same number of partner
names, on average, as those who tested at sites where names were
collected.'" Because it is the partners who are contacted during the
328 See 1.11..m.Enu OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 2.
329 See id.
33° See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 5; Kwong, supra note
327.
331 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 2.
332 See Kwong, supra note 327.
333 See Forbes, Afyilis & Facts, supra note 307, at 1.
331 See id.
335 See id.
338 See Kwong, supra note 327. About 40% of people at risk for HIV have never been tested.
See id.
337 See infra notes 338-42 and accompanying text.
338 See Dillon, supra note 309.
339 See Forbes, Myths & Fa cis, supra note 307, at 2.
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follow-up in partner notification, the name of the person testing posi-
tive is not necessary for effective partner notification. 340 If the individu-
als give their partners' names to the health department, for example,
there is no need to have the initial case reported by name to the
government."' Furthermore, because partner notification requires the
HIV-positive individuals to cooperate, some individuals may be reluc-
tant to provide the names of their partners if they know their own
names will be reported to a government entity."' Thus, given the
strong public interest in and need for HIV surveillance data, and
presuming that adequate safeguards are in place to protect a state's
centralized HIV registry, the collection of names of HIV-positive indi-
viduals in a state's registry will not violate an individual's right to
privacy."'
Even if name reporting systems were found to be unconstitutional,
unique identifier systems would still pass constitutional muster.'" With
unique identifier systems, reports submitted to state health depart-
ments link numeric codes to HIV-positive test results."' Because indi-
viduals are not linked to HIV status by their names, the type of infor-
mation disclosed in a unique identifier system is not the same type of
information disclosed in a name reporting system."' Although the
Court in Whalen recognized a valid privacy interest in medical infor-
mation relating to prescriptions, patients' names and addresses formed
the direct link to the disclosed information."' Thus, the facts underly-
ing Whalen are less comparable to unique identifier systems than to
name reporting systems."' Given that the court in Adams held that
there is no right to privacy prohibiting disclosure of social security
numbers, the Constitution does not protect the confidentiality of medi-
cal information that is linked to an individual by numeric code only."'
Additionally, there is significantly less potential for harm from
disclosure and injury resulting from disclosure in a unique identifier
system because it uses numeric codes rather than names. 55° This, in
340 See id.
541 See Dillon, supra note 809.
342 See id,
343 See Mickllebrooks, 710 So. 2d at 893.
344 See infra notes 345-53 and accompanying text.
345 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 5.
346 See id
347 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593, 599.
348 See id. at 593.
349 See In re Adams, 214 13.R. 212, 216-17 (B.A.F. 9th Cir. 1997); see also Westinghouse, 638
F.2d at 577.
330 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 5-6, 9.
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turn, affects another factor in the Westinghouse test: the adequacy of
safeguards for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure. 35 I Because
unauthorized disclosure of codes would result in less harm than that
of names, this factor is not as significant. 352 Thus, even though the
public's need for access to HIV surveillance data is the same need as
in name reporting systems, a unique identifier system will not violate
an individual's right to privacy under Westinghouse's balancing test."
B. The Equal Protection Argument
Compared to a right of privacy claim, the Equal Protection Clause
may provide an even weaker challenge to a mandatory HIV name
reporting program." The United States Supreme Court has stated that
when the challenged legislation does not restrict a fundamental right
or hinder a suspect class, a court merely examines whether there is a
rational basis for the law. 355 HIV-positive individuals are not a suspect
class because suspect classifications traditionally have been limited to
race, gender, alienage, national origin and legitimacy." Furthermore,
there is no fundamental right to confidentiality in one's HIV status. 357
Thus, mandatory reporting systems would be reviewed under the ra-
tional basis standard and would be upheld if the classification by HIV
status rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose." The party claim-
ing discrimination bears the burden of proving that the reporting
systems are irrational." Therefore, it would be very difficult for HIV-
positive individuals to prevail on an equal protection claim."
Courts have traditionally given great deference to laws and regu-
lations in the public health area, even when they implicate constitu-
tional rights. 361 As demonstrated in Jacobsen, states have the authority,
through their general police power, to enact and enforce laws to
protect people's health, safety and welfare. 362 As a result, states have
351 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
352 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 6, 9.
353 See supra notes 324-30, 344-52 and accompanying text.
354 See infra notes 355-66 and accompanying text.
355 See, e.g., Rosner v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
" See Palttiore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (race is a suspect class); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (gender is a suspect class); Barnes, supra
note 272, at 4-4.
357 See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
358 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631, 632.
359 See, e.g., Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979).
360 See supra notes 354-60 and accompanying text.
361 See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 39 (1905).
362 See id. at 25.
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the power to regulate HIV surveillance efforts.' 65 The purposes of
mandatory IIIV reporting systems—to accumulate HIV surveillance
data and to prevent the spread of HIV and AIDS—are legitimate state
goals. 964 Thus, it is unlikely that Romer would be used to strike down
an HIV reporting scheme because mere animosity toward HIV-positive
individuals, even if proven, would not be the main rationale for the
program.365 Given the legitimate public need for HIV surveillance data
and the Alabama Supreme Court decision in Middlebrooks v. State Board
of Health, HIV reporting systems are constitutional.' 66
C. Unique Identifiers May Be a Better Alternative Than Name Reporting
Although both HIV reporting systems are constitutional, unique
identifiers may be more effective from a policy perspective.' 67 One of
the main criticisms of mandatory name reporting is that individuals
will avoid testing due to fear of breaches in confidentiality and the
possibility of discrimination or stigmatization.' 68 Several studies have
indicated that mandatory name reporting would result in fewer indi-
viduals being tested. 3" The CDC and the University of Southern Cali-
fornia have conducted one of the largest HIV-testing surveys of high-
risk populations.")
 In each of nine states, 100 injection drug users on
the streets, 100 men in gay bars and 100 heterosexuals in STD clinics
See Middlebrooks, 710 So. 2d at 893.
361 See id
365 See Ron" 517 U.S. at 632.
366 710 So. 2d at 893. Procedural due process may also be useful in challenging mandatory
HIV reporting programs. See Barnes, supra note 272, at 4-5. Such a challenge would rely on the
individual's right to notice and a hearing before his or her reputation, honor or integrity is
compromised by government action. See a Adding one's name to an HIV registry could consti-
tute such damage to reputation because HIV status is often linked to character traits such as
homosexuality or drug addiction, which are often criticized by our society. See id This claim would
be particularly effective if a reporting scheme did not include extensive confidentiality precau-
tions, if the list were used for some type of government-sponsored discrimination or if the list
were available to law enforcement personnel. See id. Even with confidentiality precautions,
however, a due process claim would be tenable due to the constant threat of public disclosure of
collected names and the potential for both ridicule and discrimination. See a To withstand a
due process challenge, a mandatory HIV reporting program arguably should include a confiden-
tial administrative mechanism by which an individual could challenge the addition of his name
to the HIV registry. See id. Procedural due process may also require that a reporting program
include a mechanism through which an individual's name could be removed, if his or her HIV
status changes at a later date. See id at 4-5 11.20. The strength of any objection based on possible
changes in HIV status depends, however, on future medical evidence of the possibility and
likelihood of such HIV status changes. See id
367 See infra notes 368-405 and accompanying text.
36B See Dillon, supra note 309.
369 See id..
370 See First-Ever AIDS Incidence Decline, supra note 19, at 121.
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were interviewed about the reason they did or did not seek HIV
testing."' According to preliminary data, among those who were sur-
veyed, about twenty percent mentioned their names being reported as
one of the reasons for riot getting tested. 872 Additionally, a 1995 study
conducted at Los Angeles-based anonymous and confidential test sites
found that approximately eighty-six percent of respondents would not
have sought an HIV test if they knew their name was going to be
reported to a governmental agency." Individuals will cross state lines,
forego needed social services and avoid medical care altogether if they
fear being recorded in a name-based registry.574
Consequently, by preserving the anonymity of the individual
tested, the unique identifier system encourages all individuals to be
tested, thereby making it a better alternative to name reporting sys-
tems." Because names are not collected in a central registry, unique
identifiers may not generate the same fears of stigmatization and dis-
crimination." As a result, individuals are more likely to seek testing
because of fewer confidentiality concerns.'"
Additionally, there will likely be fewer duplication problems with
a unique identifier system than with name reporting."' An individual
will most likely use the same unique identifier code for each test. 579
Thus, a repeat tester can be identified as such and will not be double-
counted."° In contrast, the accuracy of name-based reporting depends
upon whether the testee uses a real name."' Evidence suggests that
people who must give their name when taking an HIV test will use a
pseudonym to protect their identity, 982 If individuals often access testing
pseudonymously, this hampers epidemiologists' ability to remove du-
plicates from name-based records and the provider will be unable to
follow up and link individuals to medical care."8q
371 See id.
:172 See id. hi follow-up interviews, however, only 2% of study participants mentioned name
cepoi trig as the single reason they avoided testing. See id.
373 See Dillon, supra note 309.
374 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 2.
375 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 10.
376 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 9-10.
377 See id.
378 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 55, at 10.
" See id.
38°
 See id.
381 See id.
381 See id.
553 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra nate 17, at 4.
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Unique identifier systems are not perfect.'" There can be prob-
lems with both the completeness of data and the cross-matching
against other registries.'" Thus, unique identifier systems merit addi-
tional study before being implemented in other jurisdictions.'" The
analysis should focus on identifying and correcting any deficiencies in
order to avoid repeating some of the problems that Maryland and
Texas are experiencing.'" Although there are still concerns over po-
tential breaches of confidentiality with unique identifier systems when
a social security number or other identifying information is requested,
the potential for breaches when names are used is much greater.'"
Even though it is possible to decode some unique identifier systems
(thereby revealing an individual's identity), name-based reporting sys-
tems provide even less protection for HIV-infected individuals.'"
Furthermore, while unique identifier systems have been criticized
as cumbersome and expensive, federal funding could make them more
effective and cost-efficient.'" HIV case reporting costs money to imple-
ment regardless of the type of scheme used."' Maryland and Texas set
up their systems after receiving one-time CDC grants which were allo-
cated to evaluate the systems over three years.'" In both states, the lack
of state funding exacerbated the difficulty of implementing a unique
identifier system.'" Maryland processes 7500 unique identifier-based
HIV reports per year with a system that costs about $100,000 to oper-
ate.'" New York's State Health Department spends a comparable, per-
case amount on name-based reporting of low CD4 results.'" Given the
resulting decrease in testing avoidance, the increase in community
acceptability and the improved quality of data obtainable through
unique identifier systems, Maryland regards the investment as both
manageable and worthwhile.'"
384 See BUREAU OF HIV AND STD PREVENTION, supra note 88, at 14.
335 See id.
386 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 11.
387 See
388 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 5-6.
389 See id; Forbes, Myths Co' Facts, supra note 307, at 3.
3" See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 12; Gostin ct al., supra
note 17, at 1165.
391 See Forbes, Myths Ed Facts, supra note 307, at 3.
392 See id
393
 See id
394 See Anna Forbes, HIV InSite: An Activist's Guide to Unique Identifiers (Dec. 1997)
<http://hivinsite.uesf.edu/topics/testing/2098.351r.hinii ›.
395 See id.
396 See Forbes, Naming Names, supra note 17, at 4.
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Although some argue that HIV surveillance by name has been the
tradition in many states for years with few complications or leaks in
information, most high incidence states still have not implemented a
name-based surveillance program. 307 Ultimately, the way the public
perceives the system will matter most. 398 If individuals are discouraged
from getting tested, the whole purpose of HIV surveillance is com-
pletely undermined. 399 Individuals continue to fear unauthorized dis-
closure of their HIV status and the possibility of misuse of H1V-related
data still remains."' With unique identifiers, the public health need for
HIV information can be fulfilled with less risk to individual confiden-
tiality."'
Regardless of which HIV reporting system a state eventually
chooses to adopt, anonymous publicly-funded testing should also re-
main available. 402 Many individuals will continue to need access to
anonymity for economic, insurance and personal reasons." 3 Because
some individuals would delay testing--or not be tested at all—without
remaining anonymous, these sites should be maintained."' Although
this might slightly skew epidemiological data, it will ensure that no
individual is completely prevented from testing because of fears about
confidentiality:105
VI. CONCLUSION
With innovative medical treatments delaying the progression of
AIDS, HIV data based on AIDS reporting is not sufficient. Thus, there
is now an even more compelling need to monitor HIV infection accu-
rately. HIV surveillance systems will provide health officials with more
accurate, reliable information about the prevalence, incidence and
future direction of HIV.
HIV reporting schemes represent a conflict, however, between an
individual's right to privacy and the health of the community. High
incidence states are thus currently struggling over whether they should
adopt name-based reporting or unique identifiers.
397 See id. at 1, 4.
398 See HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting, supra note 53, at 7.
399 See id. at 16.
4 °° See supra notes 300-16 and accompanying text.
4 ° 1 See Creating an Effective Public Health Response, supra note 23, at 9.
4 °2 See GMHC: HIV Monitoring (visited Feb. 15, 1998) Chttp://www.gmhc.mg/aidslib/moni-
tor.litml>.
493 See id.
' 104 See id.
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Both HIV reporting systems are likely to be constitutional as long
as strict confidentiality provisions are in place. Although the right to
privacy in personal information has not been clearly demarcated by
the United States Supreme Court, there is likely a right to privacy in
one's HIV status. This right to privacy, however, is likely to be out-
weighed by other factors, including the strong public interest in HIV
surveillance data. An equal protection challenge is also unlikely to
succeed because HIV-positive individuals are not a suspect class and
keeping HIV status confidential is not a fundamental right.
Although both systems are likely to pass constitutional muster,
unique identifier systems provide a comprehensive view of the disease
and still maintain confidentiality, thereby not discouraging HIV test-
ing. Even though unique identifier systems need to be further investi-
gated, they remain the most sensible option. For more than twenty
years, AIDS and HIV have been the center of bitter controversies. HIV
surveillance systems should not be added to this list. Rather, society
simply needs to make a sober determination of the policy that best
combines solid data collection with privacy—goals that can and should
be compatible.'"
STACEY D. BLAYER
"6 See Keeping Tkack of HIV Cases, supra note 115, at A4.
